University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 3 Spring 2005

Article 4

2005

Comments: Holding Clergy Accountable:
Maryland Should Require Clergy to Report
Suspected Child Abuse
Caroline E. Law Miller
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Miller, Caroline E. Law (2005) "Comments: Holding Clergy Accountable: Maryland Should Require Clergy to Report Suspected
Child Abuse," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 34: Iss. 3, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol34/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

HOLDING CLERGY ACCOUNTABLE: MARYLAND SHOULD
REQUIRE CLERGY TO REPORT SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE
1.

INTRODUCTION

In the Catholic Church alone, 700 clergy have been removed from
ministry since June 2002 due to the surfacing of child sexual abuse
claims. 1 Cardinal William Keeler disclosed in 2002 that allegedly
more than eighty priests in the Baltimore Archdiocese have sexually
abused minors in the past. 2 Reports of sexual abuse have been uncovered outside the Catholic Church as well. A Presbyterian missionary is
suspected of abusing twenty-two women and girls,3 while an Orthodox
Jewish youth leader is accused of dozens of cases of molestation of
teenage girls and boys.4
In many instances, colleagues of abusive clergy fail to report suspected abuse to the appropriate authorities. 5 Some claim that religious organizations conspire to keep the abuse secret. In Boston,
Catholic priest John J. Geoghan allegedly sexually abused 130 children. 6 The Boston Archdiocese, aware of the abuse, chose to keep
the matter within the Church. 7 Cardinals and bishops merely moved
Geoghan from parish to parish for thirty-four years, while he continued to molest children. 8 These same leaders also discouraged victims
of the abuse from reporting it to authorities. 9
Similar collusion has occurred elsewhere. In Jehovah's Witness
churches, leaders handle complaints of sexual abuse solely within the
church. 10 An all-male group of elders meets to decide how to proceed
with each complaint, and refuses to pursue the matter unless a witness
1. Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 700 Priests Removed
Since January 2002 (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.usccb.org/
comm/ archives/2004/04-040.h tm.
2. John Rivera, Keeler Letter Reveals Abuse, BALT. SUN, Sept. 25, 2002, at IA.
3. Kevin Eckstrom, Presbyterian Church Mulls New Rules in Sex Abuse Cases, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at B9.
4. Alan Cooperman, Sexual Abuse Scandal Hits OrthodoxJews, WASH. POST,June
29, 2002, at A2.
5. Mark Henry, Confession of Crime Leads to a Dilemma for the Clergy, L.A. TIMES,
June 1, 1986, pt. 2, at 4.
6. Michael Rezendez, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 6, 2002, at AI.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Laurie Goodstein, Ousted Members Say Jehovah's Witnesses' Policy on Abuse
Hides Offenses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 1, at 26; see also Dennis O'Brien,
Another Church Facing Charges of Sexual Abuse, BALT. SUN, May 21,2002, at lB.
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can corroborate the victim's storyY Victims are threatened with "disfellowshiping," or expulsion from the church, if they consider reporting the abuse themselves. I2 Because neither the church nor the
victims report the abuse outside the church, it is usually allowed to
continue. I3
Although abusive clergy have received much of the public attention, members of religious congregations have also sexually abused
children. I4 Some cases demonstrate that clergy have been reluctant
to report suspected abuse in those circumstances as well. I5 Furthermore, while the media has focused on the failure of clergy to report
sexual child abuse, evidence exists that suggests physical and emotional child abuse in religious institutions has also gone unreported. I6
While some churches are adopting new policies outlining how they
will deal with abusive clergy within the church,17 the states must pass
laws holding abusive and secretive clergy accountable to society. Allowing churches to form their own policies and handle allegations of
sexual abuse solely within their organizations is inadequate. A recent
study showed that, of nearly 11,000 allegations of child sexual abuse in
the Catholic Church, 149 priests accounted for twenty-six percent of
the allegations. I8 That statistic means that a group of 149 priests was
responsible for 2,860 allegations, or that each priest in the group was
to blame for an average of approximately nineteen allegations. If
other church leaders were aware of those priests' actions, and those
leaders were required to make a report at first suspicion, much of the
subsequent abuse could have been avoided.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

18.

See Goodstein, supra note 10, at 26.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 764
P.2d 759, 760-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); see also Henry, supra note 5, pt. 2, at
4.
See Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 764 P.2d at 762. In that case, a
member of the church's congregation molested children for twenty years
while church leaders, fully aware of the 'abuse, did nothing to stop it. [d. at
761-62.
See, e.g., Martin Finucane, Former Students Allege Rape, Abuse at Schoolfor Deaf,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2004, available at http://www.smccarthy.com/arch
ives/0504/now_the_nuns_are_involved.php (reporting that, in a recent
suit brought against nuns, priests, and other leaders at a religious school,
former students claimed they were beaten, sexually molested, and emotionally traumatized by nuns).
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Charter for the
Protection of Children and Young People, Revised Edition (Nov. 2002),
available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htm.
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY
CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A RESEARCH STUDY
CONDUCTED BY THE JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ix-x (Feb. 27,
2004), available at http://wwwJiay.cuny.edu/ churchstudy/main.asp [hereinafter JOHN JAY STUDY].
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Child molesters should not be able to hide behind the veil of secrecy created by their religious institutions, allowing them to repeatedly abuse their victims. Nationally, sexual child abuse is one of the
most underreported crimes. 19 Moreover, according to a representative of Maryland's Child Protective Services, Maryland underreports as
compared to the rest of the country.20 By mandating that clergy report, Maryland could increase its reporting rate. 21 For this reason,
clergy must be held to the same standard as every other individual in
Maryland; they must be required to report suspected child abuse to
the authorities. 22
As a general matter, Maryland law requires all persons to report
suspected sexual, physical, and emotional child abuse. 23 The law,
however, provides two exceptions: (1) attorneys who learn of the
abuse from their clients during confidential, privileged communications; and (2) clergy who learn of the abuse during certain confidential communications. 24 In 2003, some Maryland legislators introduced
Senate Bill 412, a bill that would have narrowed the clergy exception
by requiring clergy to report abuse disclosed to them by victims or
their family members, even if the disclosure was made during a confession or similar practice. 25 Although the bill provided an exemption
for confessions made by the perpetrator of the crime,26 some members of the religious community were outraged. 27 Many believed the
bill would violate the "Seal of the Confessional"28 and offend the traditional privilege that allows clergy to keep certain communications
19. See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OFTuSTICE, NCJ 163390, CHILD
SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH ISSUES 1 (1997), available at http://www.
ncj rs.org/ pdffiles/ 163390. pdf.
20. See Testimony of Dale Balfour before the House Judiciary Committee on
HB 1490 (bill creating the clergy exemption to the child abuse reporting
statute) (on file with author). In 2003, only 1,279 "indicated" instances of
child abuse, or those where credible evidence was not refuted, were reported in Maryland. MD. DEP'T OF HUMAN REs., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS.,
FACTS AND STATISTICS (2004), available at http://www.dhr.state.md.us/cps/
statdata.htm.
21. See Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will it Save Our Children?, 28
SETON HALL L. REv. 963, 967 (1998) (discussing the correlation between
requiring professionals to report abuse and increasing numbers of reports).
22. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (1) (i) (2004). Seediscussion infra Part
III.B.
23. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705(a)(1) (i).
24. Id. at § 5-705 (a) (2)-(3).
25. See S. 412, 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003); H.D. 823, 2003 Leg., 417th
Sess. (Md. 2003). The two versions of the bill are identical. For the text of
the bill, see infra Part IVA.
26. SeeS. 412, 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003).
27. Jo Becker, McCarrick Decries Maryland Child Abuse Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2003, at B1. Cardinal Theodore McCarrick is the leader of the Archdiocese
of Washington. Id.
28. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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confidentia1. 29 The Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings ultimately gave the bill an unfavorable report. 30
In 2004, a revised version of the bill was introduced in both the
Senate and House of Delegates. 31 The new bill would have required
clergy to report child abuse only if they were acting outside their clerical role when they learned of the abuse, if they learned of it through
non-confidential communications or observations, or if they disclosed
the abuse to a third party.32 Confessions and similar practices would
still have been exempted from the reporting requirement. 33 This bill
also failed in committee in the Maryland Senate. 34
This comment discusses the history of clergy-communicant privileges and child abuse reporting statutes, and their treatment in jurisdictions outside Maryland. 35 The comment then discusses Maryland
law in those areas. 36 Next, it recommends passage of a law similar to
Senate Bill 412,37 and evaluates possible constitutional challenges to
such a law. 38 Finally, this comment recommends the adoption of
other laws that are needed in Maryland to hold clergy fully accountable to children and society.39

II.

BACKGROUND
JURISDICTIONS

AND

TREATMENT

A.

The Clergy-Communicant Privilege

BY

OTHER

Most religious organizations require that clergy keep certain communications with members confidentia1. 40 Many of the states protect
this confidentiality by recognition of the "priest-penitent" or "clergycommunicant" privilege, which generally allows clergy to refuse to tes29. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003); discussion infra Part
II.A.
30. Jo Becker, Maryland Panel Rejects Child Abuse Bill After Uproar, WASH. POST,
March 1, 2003, at B3.
31. See S. 237, 2004 Leg., 41Sth Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 109S, 2004 Leg., 41Sth
Sess. (Md. 2004). The two versions of the bill are identical. For the text of
the bill, see infra Part IV.A.
32. See S. 237, 2004 Leg., 41Sth Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 109S, 2004 Leg., 41Sth
Sess. (Md. 2004).
33. See S. 237, 2004 Leg., 41Sth Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 109S, 2004 Leg., 41Sth
Sess. (Md. 2004).
34. See Joe Feuerherd, Maryland Committees Reject Clergy Reporting Bill, NAT'L
CATH. REp., Washington Notebook, Mar. 24, 2004, available at http://www.
nationalcatholicreporter.org/washington/wnb032404.htm.
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part IV.
3S. See infra Part V.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. For a discussion of the confidentiality of the Catholic confessional, see
Anthony Merlino, Comment, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional from Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 655
(2002).
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tifY at trial as to certain communications with those confiding in
themY In many jurisdictions, however, the privilege is a broader
rule, extending to all in-court testimony, including grand jury proceedings and administrative hearings. 42
The privilege first arose in English courts to protect communications made during confession,43 also known as the Roman Catholic
Sacrament of Penance or Sacrament of Reconciliation. 44 The Roman
Catholic Church mandates confession so that priests may absolve confessors of their sins. 45 The first American case on this subject, based
on the constitutional grounds of free exercise of religion, allowed a
Roman Catholic priest to refuse to testifY regarding confessional communications. 46 All fifty states later created court rules or statutes expanding the privilege to include communications made to clergy of all
religions. 47 Policy reasons supporting these laws included society's in41. See Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REv. 723,
740-42 (1987).
42. Id. at 787; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 2004) (extending privilege to "any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary
thereto, or in any legislative or administrative proceeding"); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 378-79, 384 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that
the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate the application of clergymen's
privilege to grand jury proceedings).
43. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 736.
44. Merlino, supra note 40, at 658. The seal of the confessional is considered
"inviolable" and priests face severe punishment by the church if broken. Id.
at 663-64. This tenet is found in the Canon Law of the Catholic Church.
1983 CODE c.983-84.
45. Merlino, supra note 40, at 658-59.
46. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. of Gen. Sess. (1813). In this case, a Roman Catholic priest refused to testifY regarding who had given him stolen goods to
return to their owner. Id. The case was never officially published, but is
reprinted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAw. 199
(1955).
47. See ALA. R. EVID. 505(b); ALAsKA R. EVID. 506(b); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (West 2003); ARK. R. EVID. 505(b); CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 1032- 1033 (West 2005); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (West
2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 2004); DEL. R. EVID. 505(b);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2004);
HAw. R. EVID. 506(b); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Michie 2004); 735 ILL.
COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/8-803 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(3)
(West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.lO(1) (West 1999); RAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-429(b) (2005); Ky. R. EVID. 505(b); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 511 (B)
(West 2005); ME. R. EVID. 505(b); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9III (2003); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 2000); MICH.
COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (WEST 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(c)
(West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22(2) (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.060(4) (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (2003); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 27-506(2) (2004); NEV. REv. STAT. 49.255 (2002); N.H. R. EVID. 505;
NJ. R. EVID. 511; N.M. R. EVID. Il-506(B); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAw § 4505 (Consol. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2003); N.D. R. EVID. 505(b); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (West 2004); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2505(B) (West 2004); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.260(2) (2003); 42 PA. CONS.
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terest in fostering confidential relationships, the individual's right to
privacy, and the free exercise of religion. 48 Most religious groups believe that confidential counseling encourages people to openly repent, receive forgiveness and guidance, and presumably lead a more
blameless life. 49 The scope of protected communications, however,
varies by jurisdiction.
Ten states recognize a privilege only for "confessions,"5o while the
others recognize a broader privilege for all "spiritual advice" or other
confidential communications. 51 Many of these rules and statutes are
ambiguous, however, leaving courts to determine whether they require the clergy or the confider to be acting under religious compulsion when the communication occurs. 52 For instance, several laws
describe protected communications with the following antiquated language originally found in People v. Phillips and the subsequendy enacted New York statute: 53 "confessions made . . . in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs. "54 The term
"confessions" literally means the acknowledgement of one's miscon-

48.
49.

50.

51.

52.
53.
54.

STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-17-23 (2004); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-13-17 (Michie
2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206(a)(1) (2000); TEX. R. EVlD. 505(b);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (2002);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5.60.060(3) (West 2004); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-301 (a) (Michie 2004);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06(2) (West 2004); WYO .. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (a) (ii)
(Michie 2003). Federal courts will follow the state law of privileges in ~Tie
cases, FED. R. EVlD. 501, but they also recognize the common law privilege
for matters offederallaw. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)
(dictum) (noting that "[t]he priest-penitent privilege recognizes the
human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive
priestly consolation and guidance in return").
Mitchell, supra note 41, at 761.
See, e.g., Merlino, supra note 40, at 658-59. This reasoning may be somewhat
flawed in the case of child abusers because many of them suffer from a
chronic disorder and cannot be cured. See Christine H. Kim, Putting Reason
Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases,
1999 ILL. L. REv. 287, 294 n.59 (1999).
See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant
Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REv.
1127, 1134 (2003). These states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at n.34.
Id. at 1133-34. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at nn.31-33.
See id. at 1136-38.
See N.Y. C.P.L.R 4505 (Consol. 2004); Privileged Communications to Clergymen,
supra note 46, at 213.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (2003).
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duct, 55 but also refers to the disclosure of sins to a priest or minister in
order to receive absolution. 56 The phrase "in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church" suggests the confession must be a ritual that
the church requires its members practice, such as the Roman Catholic
Sacrament of Penance. 57 Because these laws extend to clergy of all
religions,58 however, and most churches do not require confession,
the privilege must necessarily include even those confessions that the
church does not require. 59
B.

The Clergy Abuse Reporting Statutes

While the clergy-communicant privilege protects clergy against
compelled testimony, all fIfty states have some form of child abuse
reporting statute. 60 These laws generally require certain or all citizens
55. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1993).
Webster's defines "confession" as "the act of confessing: admission: a statement of guilt or obligation in a matter pertaining to one's self." Id.
56. See id. (alternatively defining "confession" as "acknowledgement of sins or
sinfulness; specific [ally]: the act of disclosing sins or faults to a priest to
obtain sacramental absolution or to a minister to obtain pastoral
counseling") .
57. Webster's defines "enjoin" as "[t]o direct, prescribe, or impose by order
typically authoritatively and compellingly and with urgent admonition." Id.
at 754. See also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
59. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 748 (observing that "[b]ecause most churches
do not set aside formal occasions for special private encounters labeled
'confession,' less formal consultation must be privileged if the privilege is
not in effect to be limited to Roman Catholics"). Also of concern is that, in
the Roman Catholic Church itself, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish confessional or penitential communications from other types of communication. Mitchell notes that" [a] typical counseling session will be an
unpredictable, often emotional, welter of several types of communication.
It is practically impossible to untangle the various strands of communication and make only some privileged." Mitchell, supra note 41, at 749.
60. See ALA. CODE § 2~14-3 (Supp. 2004); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (Michie
2004); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 1212-507 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11165.9 (West Supp.
2005); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West Supp. 2004); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5
(2004); HAw. REv. STAT. § 350-1.1 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 1~1619 (Michie
2001); 325 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-335-1 (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (2000); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522
(Supp. 2003); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 603 (West Supp. 2005); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4011-A (West Supp. 2004); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (Supp.
2004); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2003); MICH. CaMP.
LAws ANN. § 722.623 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.556 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1999); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.115 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2003); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 28-711 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 202.882 (Michie 2001);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2001); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:~.10 (WEST
2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 2004); N.Y. Soc. SERvo LAw § 413
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of the state to report suspected child abuse to the appropriate authorities. 61 The problem with such a requirement is that the language of
some clergy-communicant privileges is broad enough to preclude
clergy from being required to report child abuse. 62
For example, Pennsylvania's statute states that a clergyman shall not
be compelled to disclose confidential information "in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any government unit. "63 Illinois'
statute protects certain information from disclosure "in any court, or
to any administrative board or agency, or to any public officer."64
Both of these privileges seem to extend beyond testimony given at
trial to any statement provided to law enforcement authorities.
Furthermore, some of the rationale supporting the clergy-communicant privilege seems to apply in the context of child abuse reporting. 65 Those communicating with the clergy may fear disclosure to
law enforcement authorities, just as they would disclosure in a formal
court proceeding. 66 One might argue that requiring clergy to report
suspected child abuse would discourage open communication or impede the free exercise of religion. 67 Clergy may, therefore, interpret
the clergy-communicant privilege to exempt them from the requirement to report child abuse. 68
Because the clergy-communicant privilege may extend to the reporting of child abuse, these statutes create a tension between the
clergy's need to keep certain communications confidential and their

61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

(McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5025.1-03 (1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2004); OKlA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (West Supp. 2005); OR. REv. STAT. § 419B.010 (2003);
PA. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2001); RI. GEN. LAws § 40-11-3 (1997); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 268A-3 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2001); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403
(2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.21509 (Michie 2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 1997); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Michie Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981
(West 2003); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2003).
See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1138-39. These statutes usually cover all forms
of child abuse, including physical, mental, and sexual abuse; a report
should generally be made to the Department of Social Services or its
equivalent, or the local law enforcement agency. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 2614-3(b) (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(d) (West 2004); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (b) (3) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510(d) (Law. Coop.2004).
See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1139-41. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 2004).
735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/8-803 (2003).
See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1156.
See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 789-90.
See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 793-94.
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duty to help prevent child abuse. 69 Many states have addressed this
tension by requiring clergy to report suspected child abuse, unless the
communication meets certain criteria. 70 Some of these state laws specifically exempt privileged information from the reporting requirement. 71 Others make no mention of the privilege whatsoever. 72 If, in
those state laws that do not mention the clergy-communicant privilege, the privilege is interpreted to extend beyond in-court testimony,
the clergy's duty to report may be limited by that state's privilege. 73
Six states-New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia-specifically abrogate any clergy-communicant privilege in the context of child abuse reporting. 74 These
states use differing language to accomplish this result. For example,
New Hampshire's statute specifically lists priests, ministers, and rabbis
as mandatory reporters, and an annotation to the statute states, "this
obligation is not limited by religious exemption."75 North Carolina
takes a different approach by stating in one section of its code that
"any person" must report suspected abuse,76 and stating in another
section that privileges are not grounds for failing to report. 77 Importantly, in all but two of these states, the reporting requirement does
not affect the clergy privilege against in-court testimony.78
69. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 723.
70. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 728-29. Some states require clergy to report
by specifically listing clergy as mandatory reporters, while other states include "any person" in their list. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1138. Fifteen
states do not require clergy to report under any circumstances. See Abrams,
supra note 49, at 1139. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Abrams, supra note 50,
at 1139 n.55.
71. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1139. These states are Arizona, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See Abrams, supra
note 49, at 1139 n.58.
72. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1140. These states are Connecticut, Indiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See Abrams,
supra note 50, at 1140 n.60.
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301, 7B-310
(2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (West Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 40-11-3,40-11-11 (Supp. 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon
2004); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Michie 2004).
75. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301.
77. [d. at § 7B-310.
78. North Carolina and Texas are the two states that allow a defendant's confession of child abuse to his clergyman to be used during a criminal trial.
[d.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.202 (Vernon 2004). The Court of Appeals
of Texas, without addressing constitutionality, has upheld convictions
where this evidence was admitted. See Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 63, 68
(Tex. App. 2001); Martinez v. State, 2002 Tex. App. LEX IS 5975, at *3
(Aug. 15, 2002).
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These six state legislatures passed laws requiring clergy to report in
recognition of the need to protect the safety and welfare of children. 79
This is not to say that mandatory reporting laws do not have disadvantages. Some argue that requiring clergy to break confidences when
they learn of child abuse will discourage congregation members or
colleagues from confiding in them at all. 80 Also, clergy may be forced
to choose between violating the law of the state and violating the law
of their religious institutions, placing them in a difficult situation. 81
Nevertheless, six states have weighed these competing interests and
determined that a child's safety should take priority.82

III.

A.

MARYLAND LAW

The Clergy-Communicant Privilege

Maryland recognizes a very broad clergy-communicant privilege. 83
It protects any communication made in confidence to a clergyman by
a person seeking "spiritual advice or consolation."84 This broad privilege is intended to encourage people to seek assistance when they are
experiencing problems, so that they can discuss them openly and potentially resolve them. 8S By allowing clergy to refuse to testifY in court
as to confidential communications, the privilege permits church members to speak with their clergy without fear of subsequent disclosure. 86
There is no Maryland law, however, that extends the privilege beyond
testimony in court and administrative proceedings. 87
79. Shannon O'Malley, At All Costs: Mandatory Child Abuse Repmting Statutes and
the Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 21 REv. LITIG. 701, 713 (2002).
80. Id. at 711. But see supra notes 18 and 49.
81. See O'Malley, supra note 79, at 711.
82. But see id. at 718. The author recognizes that
there apparently have been no reported conVIctlons of
clergymembers in Texas for refusing to report or testify. This observation leads to the conclusion that law enforcers and prosecutors are ignoring . . . the Texas Family Code by allowing the
clergymembers to keep silent about any knowledge of child abuse
learned in the confessional.
Id.
83. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003).
84. Id. The statute reads: "A minister of the gospel, clergyman, or priest of an
established church of any denomination may not be compelled to testify on
any matter in relation to any confession or communication made to him in
confidence by a person seeking his spiritual advice or consolation." Id.
There have been no reported cases in Maryland interpreting the scope of
this privilege. See id. (there are no annotations interpreting the scope of
the statute).
85. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 762, 768.
86. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 762.
87. The privilege applies to all in-court testimony, whether at trial or some
other proceeding; however, because the statute uses the term "testify," the
privilege does not cover a clergyman's confidential disclosure of information outside of court. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003).
BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 1514 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "testify" as "to give
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The Child Abuse Reporting Statutes

Since 1987, the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code has specifically required all health practitioners, police officers, educators, and
human service workers to report all suspected instances of child sexual abuse to the local department or law enforcement agency.88 The
section further mandates that any other "person" in the state report
such suspicions. 89 In 1988, this section of the statute was amended to
provide an exemption for certain communications. 9o Subsection
(a) (2) excludes attorneys from the reporting requirement if such a
report would violate the attorney-client privilege. 91 Subsection (a) (3)
provides that clergy will not be required to disclose information protected by the clergy-communicant privilege, if that information was
communicated to the clergyman "in a professional character in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church," and the clergyman is
"bound to maintain the confidentiality of that communication under
canon law, church doctrine, or practice."92
The language of subsection (a) (3) is vague regarding what information clergy are not obligated to divulge to the authorities. Clearly,
Maryland's clergy-communicant privilege protects any communication made in confidence to a clergyman by a person seeking "spiritual
advice or consolation."93 On the other hand, the clergy reporting exemption should not be as broad as the testimonial privilege because
reporting involves the health and welfare of children that will continue to bejeopardized ifa report is not made. 94 The language of the

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.

evidence as a witness"). Black's definition does not include confidential
reports of child abuse to a department of social services. See also infra note
116.
1987 Md. Laws 635 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-704 (a) (l)(i)
(2004». Abuse is defined in the subtitle as "the physical or mental injury
of a child ... or the sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are
sustained or not." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-701 (b) (1)-(2). The local
department to which the report should be made is the department of social
services that has jurisdiction in the county where the child lives or the
abuse occurred. [d. § 5-701(0)(1)-(2).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705(a) (l)(i).
1988 Md. Laws 769, 770.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (2) (2004). The attorney-client privilege is found in section 9-108 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (2003).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (3) (2004). Interestingly, the 1988
bill, as introduced, included only an exemption for the attorney-client privilege. See 1988 Md. Laws at 770. The exemption for the clergy-communicant privilege was added to the bill as an amendment, without a committee
hearing at which the public could testifY. See id.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003).
The "legislative policy" of the subtitle specifically notes that the reporting
requirements are intended "to protect children who have been the subject
of abuse or neglect." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-702 (1999). In a recent
letter to Senator Delores G. Kelley, the chief sponsor of Senate Bill 412,
Kathryn Rowe, an Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, pointed out that
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reporting statute, however, seems to exempt a very broad category of
communications. The phrase "in the course of discipline enjoined by
the church" could simply refer to a counseling session that the church
encourages, or the confidentiality of which the church generally guarantees. 95 Furthermore, the clergyman need only be "bound to maintain the confidentiality of [the] communication under canon law,
church doctrine, or practice."96 Some churches, or even individual
clergymen, might customarily keep certain communications confidential, and interpret this "practice" as one that exempts clergy from the
duty to report child abuse.
Indeed, in a letter written to a Maryland legislator in support of the
current clergy exemption, the Executive Director of the Maryland
Catholic Conference pointed out that the exemption "relates only to
knowledge obtained during a conversation in which the clergyman
serves as spiritual advisor to a person who specifically manifests the
need for spiritual advice and guidance and which, but for the curtain
of assured confidentiality, would not likely OCCUr."97 In other words,
that Catholic leader interpreted the exemption to include all communication protected by the clergy-communicant privilege. His interpretation is understandable given the confusing language of the statute. 98
An advisory opinion of the Attorney General of Maryland provides
no clarification. In response to an inquiry from the Governor's Council on Child Abuse and Neglect, the Attorney General simply stated
that the statute "excuses reporting of certain confidential communica-

95.

96.
97.

98.

the current statute was probably intended to cover a very narrow class of
penitential communications - those where a religious requirement to communicate is placed on the confider. See Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Maryland Assistant Attorney General, to Maryland Senator Delores G. Kelley
Gan. 20, 2004) (on file with author).
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (observing that the phrase "in
the course of discipline enjoined by the church" may refer to more than
only those confessions required by the church); see also Mitchell, supra note
41, at 754-55.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (3) (ii) (2004) (emphasis added).
Letter from Richard J. Dowling, Executive Director, Maryland Catholic
Conference, to Senator Walter M. Baker, Chairman of the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee (Apr. 5, 1988), microfarmed on 276/C-305 (Md.
Dep't of Legis. Reference). In another letter, he referred to the amendment as one "designed to reinstate the priest-penitent privilege" in the
child abuse reporting context. Letter from Richard J. Dowling, Executive
Director, Maryland Catholic Conference, to Senator Nathan C. Irby (Mar.
7,1988), microfarmed on 276/C-312 (Md. Dep't of Legis. Reference). Scholars have also commented that Maryland's current statute is broad enough
to exempt spiritual advice or counseling from the reporting requirement.
See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 50, at 1146 n.85.
Even in a House Floor Report, delegates acknowledged that the original
law "unwittingly did away with the attorney-client privilege and the priestpenitent privilege. This bill is intended to correct that oversight." See H.D.
1490, 1998 Leg., 398th Sess. (Md. 1988), microfarmed on 276/C-312 (Md.
Dep't of Legis. Reference).
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tions to a minister, clergyman, or priest."99 Religious organizations
might read "certain communications" to include almost any communication between a clergyman and a member.
The Catholic Church has taken its own steps towards clarifying
which communications should be reported. For instance, the United
States Conference of Bishops released a new policy in 2002 that mandated all church officials "comply with all applicable civil laws."lOo
This clarification does not provide much guidance, however, if the
state laws are ambiguous. The Washington Archdiocese in the District
of Columbia outlined in its Child Protection Policy that personnel
shall report suspected abuse to appropriate authorities unless that information is "subject to the priest-penitent privilege." 101 Unfortunately, the Policy fails to define the priest-penitent privilege, leaving
room for a broad interpretation of the exception. The bill proposed
in Maryland in 2003 would have solved these problems.
IV.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Although Maryland's proposed amendments to the child abuse reporting statute failed in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee in
2003 and 2004, likely because of intense pressure from several religious groups,102 the legislature should not back down. As Senator
Delores G. Kelley pointed out, an amendment like that in 2003
"would serve the interests of Maryland's children, providing increased
protection when it is most needed."103 The bill was designed to limit
the current exemption and eliminate confusion as to which communications will remain exempted. 104 In particular, it was aimed at "clergy
who confer between and among themselves and/or others regarding
how to protect the public, legal, or fiscal position of their religious
99. 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 130 (1995).
100. Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, Revised Edition (Nov. 2002), available
at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htrn. See Child Safety Vs. Clergy
Rights, BALT. SUN, Nov. 13, 2002, at 14A; see also The Bishops and the Law,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10,2002, at B6.
101. Press Release, Archdiocese of Washington, Child Protection Policy (Mar.
2003), available at http://www.adw.org/commun/cpp_english.pdf.
102. See Becker, supra note 30, at B3. Members of the Senate Committee on
Judicial Proceedings received emotional letters and testimony from constituents opposing the bill. See id.; see also Letter from Elizabeth A. Konig to
Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with author) (stating that "[i]f the 'seal of
confession' is broken, as in [Senate Bill] 412 and [House Bill] 823 now
before the Maryland legislature, this ancient comity between the Catholic
Church and the State of Maryland will be violated").
103. Family Law-Child Abuse and Neglect-Reporting try Members of Clergy: Hearing on
S.B. 412 Before the Senate judicial Proceedings Comm., 2003 Leg., 417th Sess.
(Md. Feb. 25, 2003) (testimony of Sen. Delores G. Kelley) (on file with
author).
104. [d.
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institution, in light of a suspected or acknowledged case of child
abuse."105 These are all compelling reasons for the Maryland legislature to pass a bill similar to Senate Bill 412.

A.

Language of the 2003 Proposed Bill

Senate Bill 412 elucidated exactly which types of communications
must be reported to authorities, creating a bright-line rule for religious leaders. 106 It would have required all communications other
105. Id.
106. SeeS. 412,2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003). As introduced, Senate Bill 412
read as follows:
(a) (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including a law on
privileged communications, a person in this state other than a
health practitioner, police officer, or educator or human service
worker who has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to
abuse or neglect shall:
(i) if the person has reason to believe the child has been subjected
to neglect, notify the local department or the appropriate law enforcement agency; or
(ii) if the person has reason to believe the child has been subjected
to neglect, notify the local department.
(2) A person is not required to provide notice under paragraph (1)
of this subsection:
(i) in violation of the privilege described under § 9-108 of the
Courts Article;
(ii) if the notice would disclose matter communicated in confidence by a client to the client's attorney or other information relating to the representation of the client; or
(iii) in violation of any constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
(3) (I) A minister of the gospel, clergyman, or priest of an established church of any denomination is not required to provide notice under paragraph (1) of this subsection if the notice would
disclose matter in Felation W any EOFHmuniEation desEribed in § 9
III of the COUFts l'\Ftiele and:
(i) the EommuniEation was made to tHe FHinisteF,eleFg}'man, OF
pFiest in a pFofessional EHaFaEteF in tHe EOUFSe of disEipline en
joined by tHe EHUFEH to 'n'HiEH tHe ministeF, eleFgyman, OF priest
belongs; and
W COMMUNICATED BY THE PERPETRATOR IN THE
COURSE OF A CONFESSION, AND the minister, clergyman, or
priest is SPECIFICALLY bound to maintain the confidentiality of
that communication under canon law, OR church doctrine, or
practice.
(II) SUBPARAGRAPH (I) OF THIS PARAGRAPH MAY NOT BE
CONSTRUED TO MODIFY OR LIMIT THE DUTY TO REPORT
SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT:
1. WHENEVER A MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST DESCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (I) OF THIS PARAGRAPH ACTS
IN A CAPACITY THAT WOULD OTHERWISE REQUIRE THE
MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST TO REPORT SUSPECTED
ABUSE OR NEGLECT UNDER THIS SUBTITLE; OR
2. IF INFORMATION REGARDING THE SUSPECTED ABUSE OR
NEGLECT:
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than confessions or similar communications of the perpetrator to be
reported. 107
The bill deleted the confusing language found in current subsection (a) (3) (i)-"communication ... in the course of discipline enjoined by the church"-and instead added language that limits the
exception to confessions of the perpetrator. 108 By using the word
"confession," the bill probably would have limited the exemption to
communications made during the Roman Catholic Sacrament of Penance or similar practices. 109 While the bill retained the requirement
that the clergyman be bound to maintain the confidentiality of the
communication under canon law or church doctrine, the bill clarified
that such confidentiality must be specifically required. 110 The bill also
deleted the word "practice" from current subsection (a) (3)(I)(ii) .111
Both of these changes would have made the exemption narrower and
less ambiguous than the current law by ensuring that clergy act under
specific church doctrine, rather than habit or custom, when deciding
to keep communication confidential. 112 Finally, the bill included a
subsection that listed circumstances in which the exception would not
apply and the clergyman would be required to report. 1I3

B.

Public Policy Reasons Supporting the 2003 Proposed Bill

Passage of a bill like Senate Bill 412 would promote sound public
policy. While some may incorrectly argue that this bill offends the

107.
108.
109.

110.
111.
112.
113.

A. WAS OBTAINED FROM ANY SOURCE OTHER THAN BY THE
PERPETRATOR IN THE COURSE OF A CONFESSION, INCLUDING PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF A VICTIM, EVEN THOUGH
INFORMATION ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE
PERPETRATOR IN THE COURSE OF A CONFESSION;
B. WAS COMMUNICATED BY THE PERPETRATOR IN THE
COURSE OF A CONFESSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A THIRD
PARTY; OR
C. WAS COMMUNICATED BY THE PERPETRATOR IN THE
COURSE OF A CONFESSION AND DISCLOSED BY A MINISTER,
PRIEST, OR CLERGYMAN DESCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH TO
A THIRD PARTY.
Id. The struck-through text would be deleted from MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAw § 5-705 (2002). The text in all capital letters would be added.
See id.
See supra note 106.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text. While this language probably
encompassed certain communications with clergy from churches outside
the Catholic faith, the bill might have benefited from changing the word
"confession" to "confidential penitential communication" to more clearly
indicate this point. Such language was used in the 2004 version of the bill.
See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra note 106.
See supra note 106.
See supra note 106.
See supra note 106.
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clergy-communicant privilege,l14 Maryland law has traditionally only
recognized the privilege in the context of court proceedings. 115 The
privilege does not extend to other situations outside of court, including the reporting of suspected child abuse. 116 By removing a crossreference to the clergy-communicant privilege, confusion regarding
the scope of the exemption would be eliminated. Furthermore, a
clergyman making a child abuse report would be guaranteed confidentiality,117 and could still invoke the clergy-communicant privilege
during subsequent court proceedings. 118
Additionally, the spirit of the confessional would not be dishonored, because the bill would still exempt true "confessions" of sin. 119
Perpetrators would be encouraged to speak with their priests, ministers, or rabbis, because they would not fear being reported to authorities. 120 Therefore, open communications and the potential resolution
of problems would still be fostered.1 21
On the other hand, communications made by victims of abuse or
third parties are not "confessions" at all, because those children did
not commit a sin. Children may be simply reaching out to someone
they trust for help and guidance, most likely because they feel uncomfortable reporting the abuse themselves. 122 Clergy should be responsible for taking that step for them, instead of perpetuating feelings of
114. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
115. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003).
116. Id. The statute states only that a minister, priest, or rabbi "may not be compelled to testify" regarding confidential communications. See supra note 87.
See also Letter from Lynn McLain, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law, to Senator Brian Frosh, Chairman of the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee (Feb. 20, 2003) (on file with author). In this letter, McLain points out that "[Senate Bill] 412 does not address in-court
testimony. Rather, it imposes a legal obligation to make an out-of-court
report. The exception it carves out from that duty must be as narrowly
defined as possible, or the reporting requirement will be totally gutted." Id.
117. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-707 (2004).
118. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2002).
119. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Studies show that victims of child
sexual abuse very rarely report it themselves.
121. One supporter of Senate Bill 412 has pointed out that, even if the bill required clergy to report perpetrators' confessions, perpetrators would not
necessarily be discouraged from communicating with clergy. See Family Law
- Child Abuse and Neglect - Reporting by Members of Clergy: Hearing on S.B. 412
Before the Senate judicial Proceedings Comm., 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. Feb.
25, 2003) (testimony of Ellen Mugmon) (on file with author). She suggested that research shows trust, and not necessarily confidentiality, is what
fosters a therapeutic relationship. Id. Therefore, if a clergyman informs a
confessor up front that a report could potentially be made, the confessor
may still disclose the abuse. See id.
122. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. This would provide "increased
protection when it is most needed" by the state's children. See supra note
103 and accompanying text. See also JOHN JAY STUDY, supra note 18, at 1314.
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guilt and suggesting that it is acceptable to keep abuse secret. While
some may argue that if a child does not wish to report the abuse, the
clergyman should honor that desire, the State's interest in prosecuting child abusers should outweigh the victim's interest in privacy.123
The bill also clarifies situations in which clergy are specifically
bound to report. 124 First, they must report abuse if it was disclosed to
them by a third person as well as by the perpetrator. 125 In this way,
the clergyman would not be reporting the perpetrator's confession,
but rather the third party's disclosure of abuse, of which the clergyman was already aware. 126 As Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
Kathryn M. Rowe, stated, "[i]t should not be open to a defendant to
remove possible sources of information about his or her crimes simply
by confessing to them."127
Second, a third party's presence during the perpetrator's confession would break the duty of confidentiality and require a report to be
made, as would the clergyman's disclosure of the confession to any
other third person. 128 This parallels the evidentiary privilege, which
both federal and state courts have found to be inapplicable when information is disclosed in the presence of a third party. 129 Therefore, a
clergyman would not be able to discuss a perpetrator's confession of
child sexual abuse with his colleagues without invoking the duty to
report. 130
Third, the exemption would not apply any time the clergyman was
acting outside the capacity of priest, minister, or rabbi when hearing
123. See infra note 177 (discussing a California case that found a state's interest
in the apprehension of felons and prevention of child abuse are "compelling" for purposes of constitutional analysis).
124. See supra note 106.
12S. See supra note 106.
126. See Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Maryland Assistant Attorney General, to
Maryland Senator Delores G. Kelley (Jan. 20, 2004) (on file with author).
127. [d.
128. See supra note 106.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 61S F.2d 828, 828 (9th Cir. 1980) (prisoner
confessed to chaplain in front of officer); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822, 829
(La. 1975) (defendant told minister of crimes while two other people were
present). While Maryland courts have never decided if a clergyman may
waive the privilege by making a disclosure to a third party, such a principle
is in line with other states' interpretation of the privilege. See, e.g., State v.
Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 836 (NJ. 1994) (holding that the privilege could be
waived by a clergyman without the consent of the communicant). Also, as
Professor McLain points out, the language of the statute itself-"[a] minister, [priest, or rabbi] ... may not be compelled"-implies that the clergyman holds the privilege and his disclosure to a third party will waive it. See
Letter from Professor McLain, supra note 116.
130. This section of the bill ensures clergy do not secretly "confer between and
among themselves and/or others regarding how to protect the public, legal, or fiscal position of their religious institution." See supra text accompanying note lOS.
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of the abuse. I31 For example, if the clergyman learned of abuse while
coaching the church basketball team or attending a neighborhood
picnic, the duty to report would attach. In those instances, the church
member probably does not have an expectation that the communication will be kept secret and the communication does not rise to the
level of a religiously compelled "confession."
Not only does the bill clarify exactly which information is not exempted, it also provides an avenue for clergy that would like to report
sexual abuse, but fear violating church law. I32 The few churches that
punish clergy for revealing confidential information would have to tolerate adherence to a generally applicable law of the government. I33
In fact, many churches may approve of the requirement because, by
making child abuse reporting mandatory, the statute prevents the report from constituting a waiver of the privilege at a subsequent
trial. I34 Waiver of an evidentiary privilege occurs only when the
holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses information to a third
person. I35
This bill would also correct a bizarre incongruity in the law that
requires psychotherapists to report child abuse, but exempts clergy
from the same dUty.136 Maryland law recognizes both a clergy-communicant and psychotherapist-patient privilege for in-court testi131. See supra note 106.
132. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
133. A California appellate court has found that, where a priest was dismissed
from service in retaliation for reporting another priest's sexual abuse of a
child, judicial review of the priest's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation was appropriate. Conley v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of S.F., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 683 (2000). Clergy would also be
immune from civil liability for making the report, so long as it was done in
good faith. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-708 (2004).
134. See Letter from Lynn McLain, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law, to Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings
Committee (Mar. 4, 2004) (on file with author).
135. See Letter from Professor McLain, supra note 116.
136. The statute exempts only communications protected by the attorney-client
and c1ergy-communicant privileges. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705
(2004). It previously contained an exemption for certain communications
between a psychotherapist and patient (known as the "Berlin exemption"),
but that exemption was repealed in 1989. See 1989 Md. Laws 730. Interestingly, one of the reasons for repealing the exemption was that therapy does
not cure pedophilia, so encouraging child molesters to seek treatment
would not actually solve their problem. See H.D. 1210, 1989 Leg., 384 Sess.
(Md. 1989), micro/armed on 276/C-328 (Md. Dept. of Legis. Reference).
One could argue that the c1ergy-communicant privilege should also be repealed in its entirety because encouraging molesters to confide in clergy
will not stop them from abusing children. The other reason for repealing
the psychotherapist-patient exemption was that abusers do not seek treatment voluntarily, but only when there is a threat of disclosure if they do
not. Therefore, removing the exemption would not decrease the number
of abusers seeking voluntary treatment. See H.D. 1210, 1989 Leg., 384 Sess.
(Md. 1989), micro/armed on 276/C-328 (Md. Dept. of Legis. Reference).
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mony.I37 While many of the reasons supporting the extension of
these privileges to child abuse reporting are the same for both groups,
the law reaches different results. In both cases, a privilege was created
to encourage open communications and the resolution of
problems. I38 If the legislature has determined that requiring psychotherapists to report is so important to the public safety as to warrant
severing a confidential relationship, why has it not done the same for
clergy?I39 Critics of the bill may argue that it would violate the clergy's
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. As discussed below, however, this argument lacks support in the law. I40
C.

The 2004 Version oj the Bill

The version of the bill introduced in the Senate in 2004 was modified to allow clergy to keep many communications confidential. 141
137. The psychotherapist-patient privilege is found in MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (2002).
138. See, e.g., McCormack v. Bd. of Educ. of Bait. County, 158 Md. App. 292, 30506, 857 A.2d 159, 167 (2004) (discussing the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court stated that "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment"). See al50 J. Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again: The PriestPenitent Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMBo L. REv. 681, 689
(1997-98).
139. Other scholars have recognized the need for uniformity in this area.
O'Malley, supra note 79, at 713 (stating that "[m]andatory child abuse reporting statutes guarantee that there is equal treatment across the board
for professionals who generally assert a privilege"). For a thorough discussion of the disparity between the treatment of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege and the clergy-communicant privilege in child abuse reporting
statutes, see Keel, supra note 138.
140. See infra Part IV.
141. S. 237, 2004 Leg., 418th Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 1098,2004 Leg., 418th Sess.
(Md. 2004). In pertinent part, the modified bill read as follows:
(3) (I) A minister of the gospel, clergyman, or priest of an established church of any denomination is not required to provide notice under paragraph (1) of this subsection if the notice would
disclose matter iH relausH ts aHY eSffiffiuHieatisH aeserisea iH § 9
111 sf the Gsurts Mude aHa COMMUNICATED TO THE MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST IN THE COURSE OF A CONFIDENTIAL PENITENTIAL COMMUNICATION AND:
1. THE MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST IS SPECIFICALLY
BOUND TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALI1Y OF THAT
COMMUNICATION UNDER CANON LAW OR CHURCH DOCTRINE; AND
2. the communication was made to the minister, clergyman, or
priest in a professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister, clergyman, or priest
belongs[; and the minister, clergyman, or priest is bound to maintain the confidentiality of that communication under canon law,
church doctrine, or practice].; aHa the ffiiHister, derg},fflaH, sr
priest is ssuHa ts ffiaiHtaiH the eSHfiaeHtiality sf that eSffiffiUHiea
tiSH uHaer eaHSH la''<\', ehureh asetriHe, or praetiee.
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While not as effective as the 2003 version of the bill,142 it still would
have been a huge victory in the protection of children.
This bill differed from Senate Bill 412 of 2003 because it would have
exempted clergy from reporting information learned from anyone
during confidential penitential communications,143 rather than confessions of the perpetrator only.144 The phrase "confidential penitential communications" is somewhat unclear, but probably includes
Roman Catholic confessions and similar practices in other churches.
The bill also differed from Senate Bill 412 of 2003 by retaining the
confusing phrase "in the course of discipline enjoined by the church"
found in the current statute. 145
The bill was similar to Senate Bill 412 of 2003, in that it also included language that clarified when clergy must report. Clergy would
still have been required to report if they learned of the abuse when
acting in a capacity other than that of a clergyman, thereby rendering
the clergy-communicant relationship inapplicable. 146 Clergy would
have been required to report abuse they learned about from any
source other than a confidential penitential communication. 147 The
bill specifically provided that personal observations must be reported. 148 Finally, any time a confession was made in the presence of
(II) SUBPARAGRAPH (I) OF THIS PARAGRAPH MAY NOT BE
CONSTRUED TO MODIFY OR LIMIT THE DUTY TO REPORT
SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT:
l. WHENEVER A MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST OF AN
ESTABLISHED CHURCH OF ANY DENOMINATION FUNCTIONS IN A ROLE THAT WOULD OTHERWISE REQUIRE THE
MINSTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST TO REPORT SUSPECTED
ABUSE OR NEGLECT UNDER THIS SUBTITLE; OR
2. IF INFORMATION REGARDING THE SUSPECTED ABUSE OR
NEGLECT:
A. WAS OBTAINED IN ANY MANNER OTHER THAN AS DESCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS PARAGRAPH, INCLUDING PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF A VICTIM, EVEN
THOUGH INFORMATION ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN OBTAINED
AS DESCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS PARAGRAPH;
B. WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE MINISTER, CLERGYMAN,
OR PRIEST IN THE PRESENCE OF A THIRD PERSON; OR
C. WAS DISCLOSED BY THE MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR
PRIEST TO A THIRD PERSON.
Id.
142. In fact, Kathryn Rowe pointed out that the bill may not substantively
change the current law at all, but may simply provide clearer language. See
Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, supra note 126.
143. See supra note 14l.
144. See supra note 14l.
145. See supra note 14l.
146. See supra note 14l.
147. See supra note 14l.
148. See supra note 14l.
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a third party or the clergyman revealed abuse to a third person, the
broken confidentiality would have required a report to be made. 149
The bill, while lacking the bright-line rule that all information other
than a perpetrator's confession must be reported, still aimed to discourage clergy from conferring among themselves and choosing to
deal with allegations of abuse within the church.I50 It also clarified
the instances in which clergy must report. 15I However, the bill would
not have adequately protected victims and family members who tell
clergy about the abuse during a "confession."152 In these situations,
the clergyman would have no duty to report. 153
Like critics of Senate Bill 412 of 2003, critics of the 2004 bill may
argue that requiring clergy to report child abuse in some circumstances violates the clergy's constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion. As the following section explains, such a law would be well
within the boundaries of the United States Constitution.

v.

CONSTITUTIONALI1Y OF A MANDATORY REPORTING LAW

A child abuse reporting statute that includes clergy as mandated
reporters would not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 154 The United States Supreme Court will uphold generally applicable state laws that infringe only incidentally upon a person's religious beliefs. I55 In fact, a reporting law that creates a broad
exemption for clergy may conflict with the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. I56 A court might find that such an exemption
improperly promotes religion. I57
A.

The Free Exercise Clause

State laws applicable to the public in general, and not aimed specifically at religious groups, will not violate the Free Exercise Clause. In
1940, the Supreme Court noted that "[c]onscientious scruples have
not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved
the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the proSee supra note 141.
See supra note 141.
See supra note 141.
See supra note 141.
See supra note 141.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." [d. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend XIV; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
155. See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
156. U.S. CONST. amend I.
157. See infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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motion or restriction of religious beliefs."158 The Court reiterated this
principle in its 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 159 when it
found that a neutral law of general applicability-one that criminalized the use of narcotics, including the sacramental use of peyotewas valid. 160
The Court in Smith went on to hold that the government does not
need to show a compelling interest in order for the Court to uphold a
generally applicable law affecting an individual's religious beliefs. 161
The Court noted that such a rule "would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind."162
Congress attempted to abrogate this holding in Smith when it
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) .163
The statute's stated purpose was "to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398 (1963) ... and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened."164 However, the Supreme Court responded
to RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores,165 when it held the statute was unconstitutional as applied to state government action. 166 The Court
pointed out that Congress had overstepped its bounds and violated
the separation of powers by enacting RFRA.167 Therefore, the Smith
test still applies to most Free Exercise challenges. 168
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
167.
168.

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 878-82.
Id.
Id. at 888.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2003).
Id. The balancing test in Sherbert set forth that governmental actions substantially burdening religious practices must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
This test was applied where unemployment benefits were denied based on
an individualized consideration of whether an employee had either quit work,
or not accepted work, for "good cause." See id. at 400-01. Smith held that
such a test applied only to a very narrow field of factual situations like the
one in Sherbert. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id.
Id. at 536.
There are still two instances when a compelling interest test will apply to
challenges of statutes affecting religious beliefs. One occurs in situations
where free exercise is affected by individualized considerations, as in Sherbert. See supra note 164. The second, known as a "hybrid-rights" violation,
occurs when a statute infringes upon not only freedom of religion, but also
upon some other constitutionally protected interest. See Smith, 494 U.S. at
881. One author has attempted to argue that mandating clergy to report
child abuse violates both the free exercise rights of the confessor as well as
the free exercise rights of the church. See Merlino, supra note 40, at 697.
However, the Smith court points out that it has only found a generally applicable law to violate the Free Exercise Clause when it also violated freedom
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Senate Bill 412 would certainly pass muster under the principles set
forth in Smith. Like the statute in Smith, which prohibited the knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance, 169 a
mandatory child abuse reporting statute is a law of general applicability. It is a law requiring every citizen in the State of Maryland to protect children by reporting suspected child abuse to the authorities. 170
It is not aimed at restricting religious beliefs, but instead at ensuring
the health and welfare of children. 171
Even if a court were to apply the compelling interest test to Senate
Bill 412, the law would be upheld. As the Supreme Court set forth in
1944 in Prince v. Massachusetts,I72 the government has an interest in
the protection of children sufficient to outweigh sacred religious interests. I73 In 1982, the Court noted in New York v. Ferber that "[i]t is
evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is
'compelling."'174 Therefore, Maryland's proposed bill, which aims to
protect the welfare of children,I75 would be beyond the reach of any
First Amendment argument. I76 It serves the compelling government
interest of protecting children.
There have been no reported constitutional challenges to state statutes requiring clergy to report confessional communications. A California state court, however, has already decided the constitutionality
of a mandatory reporting statute that specifically exempts confessional
communications. I77 The court decided that California's law, which
mandates reports of information learned from any communication
other than a confession, is constitutional. I78 The court stated that

169.
170.
17l.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

177.
178.

of speech or the press, or the right of parents to direct the education of
their children. Smith, 494 U.S. at 88l.
Id. at 874. The individuals challenging the statute claimed that denial of
unemployment benefits based on their sacramental use of peyote violated
the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
Senate Bill 412 requires, with limited exceptions, "any person" to report
suspected abuse. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the Court upheld a parent's conviction for
permitting an infant to work in violation of state law, and rejected the parent's claim that the law violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 165-66.
458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
One scholar has even hypothesized that abolition of the privilege for all
purposes would be constitutional under a Smith analysis. John J. Montone,
III, In Search of Forgiveness: State v. Szemple and the Priest-Penitent Privilege in
Newjersey, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 263, 281-82 (1995).
See People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1992). This case was followed in Conley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
S.F., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (2000), discussed supra at note 133.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (West Supp. 2005); Hodges, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 420.
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"the mere fact that a petitioner's religious practice is burdened by a
governmental program does not mean an exception . . . must be
granted," and that if the petitioners were exempt from reporting, "the
[reporting requirement] 's purpose would be severely undermined."179 The court also believed the state's interests in the apprehension of felons and prevention of child abuse were compelling. 180
Therefore, Maryland's child abuse reporting statute might also be
deemed constitutionally valid. Simply because Senate Bill 412 incidentally burdens the religious practices of some clergy does not mean
it is unconstitutional. Also, it would serve the same compelling state
interests that the California law now serves. In fact, without removing
the clergy exemption from the current Maryland law, the law may violate another constitutional provision found in the First Amendmentthe Establishment Clause.

B.

The Establishment Clause

The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Establishment
Clause requires that
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. I81
This interpretation is vital to the continued separation of church and
state. A child abuse reporting statute, with a religious exemption affecting the health and welfare of children, can be viewed as an impermissible attempt to aid religion. It is not a neutral statute, but one
expressly providing that some citizens are not required to comply because of their religious practices. 182
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,183 the Supreme Court established a three-part
test for use in determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause. 184 The Court held that the statute first must have a "secular legislative purpose."185 Second, its "principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion."186 Finally,
"the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420.
Id. at 419.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (2004).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612-13.
Id. at 612.
Id.
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with religion.' "187 Maryland courts have followed this approach quite
strictly, particularly in cases involving children.
In Davis v. State,188 the Court of Appeals of Maryland cautioned that
any religious exemption potentially affecting the health and welfare of
children should be carefully scrutinized under Establishment Clause
principles. 189 In that case, a parent challenged a religious exemption
from a law requiring school children to be immunized. 190 He argued
that the exemption, which applied only to conflicts with the tenets of
recognized churches or religious denominations, should apply to conflicts with personal beliefs. 191 The court, in ruling that the exemption
did not include personal beliefs, also found the exemption unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 192
Applying the principles of Lemon and Davis to Maryland's current
reporting law confirms that it may be invalid. While it is true that the
exemption may have the secular legislative purpose of encouraging
open communications and the resolution of the abuser's problems,193
its principal effect is to advance religion. 194 Permitting clergy to keep
confessions of abuse secret usually does not resolve the problem, but
instead allows the abuser to continue molesting children. 195 Therefore, the statute's principal effect is not to resolve problems, but to
allow religious institutions to exacerbate them. This type of exemption probably constitutes "excessive entanglement," which the Supreme Court has proscribed. 196 A Maryland court might, therefore,
find the current reporting law as an unconstitutional attempt to advance religion, especially given that it involves the health and welfare
of children.
As well as advancing religion in general, the statute appears to favor
one religion over another. If the statute were read to protect only
confessional communications, it would apply only to those religions
that practice confession. 197 The Supreme Court has held that such
laws are subject to strict scrutiny.198 Therefore, the state must have a
compelling interest for the discrimination, and the law must be
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970».
294 Md. 370, 451 A.2d 107 (1982).
Id. at 378-79,451 A.2d at 111-12.
Id. at 374,451 A.2d at 109.
Id.
Id. at 382,451 A.2d at 114.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra note 18.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-59. See also supra note 109 and accompanying text (commenting that Senate Bill 412 might benefit from an amendment
that changes the word "confession" to "confidential penitential
communications") .
198. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
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"closely fitted" to that interest. 199 In the case of a child abuse reporting statute, there can be no conceivable state interest in preferring
one religion over another. There is no legitimate reason to allow
some religions to keep abuse secret, while others must report it to
authorities.
Because of these constitutional concerns, it is imperative that the
Maryland legislature pass a child abuse reporting statute that does not
include an impermissible exemption for clergy. Maryland must pass a
bill like Senate Bill 412. In addition to a law that strengthens Maryland's child abuse reporting statute, there are other laws that could be
created to better protect the state's children.
VI.

OTHER LAWS

Maryland has done much in the way of protecting children from
sexual abuse. The Maryland legislature recently adopted a new sentencing guideline for the sexual abuse of children. 20o Any person
convicted of sexual abuse of a minor may receive up to the maximum
sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment. 201 Another bill recently
passed by the Maryland legislature affects the statute of limitations for
victims wishing to bring civil suits against their abusers.202 Victims
may now bring suit until seven years after they reach the age of majority.203 These laws are proper steps towards holding child abusers responsible for their actions. Maryland is one of few states, however,
with no criminal penalty for failing to report suspected child abuse. 204
Some legislators are attempting to pass a bill that would make failing to report sexual abuse a misdemeanor for health practitioners,
police officers, educators, and human service workers. 205 The penalty
would be a $1,000 fine. 206 In 2004, a similar bill was successful in the
Maryland Senate, but did not pass in the House. 207 The bill needs to
199. Id. at 246-47.
200. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-602 (2002).
201. Id. at § 3-602(c). This law should be strictly enforced. Only two percent of
priests and deacons accused of child sexual abuse have served prison
sentences. JOHN JAY STUDY, supra note 18, at xii.
202. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-117 (Supp. 2004). This law is necessary because victims of child abuse often are reluctant to come forward willi
information of abuse until many years after it has occurred. See supra notes
19-20.
203. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-l.i7. Legislators are now attempting
to increase the limitations period to twenty-eight years after the age of majority. See H.D. 1376, 2005 Leg., 420th Sess. (Md. 2005).
204. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (Supp. 2004). An advisory opinion of
the Maryland Attorney General points out that the duty to report is
mandatory, despite the lack of a penalty for failure to report. 60 Op. Md.
Att'y Gen. 51 (1975).
205. See S. 106, 2005 Leg., 420th Sess. (Md. 2005); H.D. 845, 2005 Leg., 420th
Sess. (Md. 2005).
206. Id.
207. See S. 195, 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003).
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be passed, and extended to include penalties for all persons failing to
report. Simply requiring people to report, without providing a penalty for failure to do so, is ineffective.
Recently in Ohio, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cincinnati
became the first diocese in the United States to be penalized for failing to report sexual 'abuse of children. 208 The judge, imposing the
maximum fine of $2,000 on each of the five counts, commented that
he believed "everybody has the duty to follow the law."209 He further
expressed disappointment that the religious leaders had failed their
moral duty to report serious crimes against children, placing "selfpreservation" as their highest priority.210
Many other states have criminal penalties for failure to report child
abuse or neglect. The extent of the penalty varies by state. Tennessee, for example, treats failure to report as a misdemeanor, and provides a maximum fine of fifty dollars if the defendant pleads guilty.211
In contrast, Mississippi punishes those who violate its reporting law by
a fine up to $5,000 or imprisonment up to one year, or both. 212 Other
states take more creative approaches. For instance, Illinois treats the
first violation of its reporting statute as a misdemeanor, and the second as a felony.213 Additionally, physicians or dentists that violate the
law will be referred to their disciplinary boards. 214
Maryland should also create, as other states have done, an express
provision for civil liability when clergy fail to report suspected child
abuse. The law currently does not provide for a civil cause of action,
but creating one would further encourage clergymen to report suspected abuse. 215 Such a cause of action would also provide relief to
those injured by the clergy's failure to report.
208. Alan Cooperman, Archdiocese Fined in Abuse Coverup, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
2003, at A3. Surprisingly, no other religious leaders have been convicted.
This is true even in Texas, a state with very strict child abuse reporting
requirements. See supra note 82.
209. Cooperman, supra note 208, at A3.
210. Id.
211. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-412 (Supp. 2001).
212. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353(7) (Supp.2004).
213. 325 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/4.02 (West Supp. 2004).
214. Id.
215. Although Maryland does not expressly allow a civil cause of action for failure to report child abuse, a private plaintiff may still make out a claim for
negligence. See Bentley V. Carroll, 355 Md. 312, 325-26, 734 A.2d 697, 705
(1999) (holding that, although Maryland's (now superceded) Child Abuse
Act did not impose criminal or civil liability for failure to report child
abuse, violation of the statute "may furnish evidence of negligence ... 'if
the person alleging negligence is within the class of persons sought to be
protected, and the harm suffered is of the kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent"') (citing Atlantic Mutual V. Kenney, 323
Md. 116, 124,591 A.2d 507,510-11 (1991». Even though private plaintiffs
may have a claim in negligence, a statutory cause of action would put citizens on notice that the duty to report is serious and could result in personal
liability. Such a statute might read: "Any person who knowingly violates the
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CONCLUSION

The Maryland legislature must take action to protect the children of
the state. Sexual abuse by clergy has run rampant, and secrecy within
religious institutions has exacerbated the harm done. 216 As Maryland's current child abuse reporting statute exempts clergy from reporting anything that would fall within the clergy-communicant
privilege,217 it should be amended to require clergy to report all suspected instances of child abuse. Such a law would be constitutional
under the Free Exercise Clause, and would put to rest any Establishment Clause concerns the current law creates. 218 Finally, in order for
the law to be fully effective, Maryland must create penalties for failure
to report under the new law. 219

Caroline E. Law Miller

216.
217.
218.
219.

provisions of § 5-705 shall be liable for civil damages proximately caused
thereby." Cf COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West Supp. 2004).
See discussion supra Part I.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See discussion supra Part V.

